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ABSTRACT
A pronounced drop in crime since the early 1990s has encompassed every crime category
tracked by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, including property crime. However, over
the same period, the rates of Online Property Crime (OPC) have been on the rise
according to available evidence. We delineate the extent of our knowledge and data
concerning cyber crime and identity theft and, using data from several nationally
representative victimization surveys, offer an alternative view of property crime trends
while pointing out the glaring gap in crime reporting and accounting in relation to the
growing category of property crimes perpetrated online. In addition, we compare
estimated costs of traditional property crime versus online property crime. Finally, we
identify the main challenges for obtaining reliable data on online property crime and
discuss their implications, especially when applying the traditional methods of compiling
crime statistics.

INTRODUCTION: DID CRIME DROP OR DID WE DROP THE BALL?
A pronounced drop in crime since the early 1990s has encompassed every crime
category tracked by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (Truman, 2011; U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2013). It has affected property crime (burglary, larceny/theft,
motor vehicle theft, etc.) as well as violent crime (homicide, robbery, rape, etc.). Over the
same period, the rates of internet-perpetrated crime – often in the forms of identity theft,
fraud, and cyber-attacks on organizational computer networks, among others – have been
on the rise according to available sources of data (Allison, Schuck, and Lersch, 2005;
Langton, 2011; Newman, 2009a; Symantec, 2012; U.S. Federal Trade Commission,
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2004, 2008, 2012). Notwithstanding these contrary trends, criminologists frame crime
trends since the 1990s within the paradigm of a ‘crime drop’ (Blumstein and Wallman,
2005; Goldberger and Rosenfeld, 2008), and have generally neglected the possibility that
official statistics are an increasingly incomplete reflection of the extent of criminal
activity in the United States. This paper explores the implications of that possible
omission.
In this paper, we delineate the extent of our knowledge and data concerning
Online Property Crime (OPC) and offer an alternative view of property crime trends
generally while pointing out the glaring gap in crime reporting and accounting in relation
to the crimes perpetrated online, which are likely growing in number. In addition, we
compare estimated costs of traditional property crime to those of OPC. Finally, we
identify the main challenges in obtaining reliable data on OPC, especially when applying
the traditional methods of compiling crime statistics. The framework offered in the
current article challenges the traditional perception of property crime as following the
same downward trend as violent crime. It is our hope that the discussion started here will
facilitate efforts to gather relevant information to track the trends in OPC more
accurately.

DEFINING AND COUNTING ONLINE PROPERTY CRIME1
We use the term Online Property Crime to cover a wide variety of property crimes
perpetrated online including identity theft, credit card theft and fraud, cyber attacks on
organizational networks resulting in security breaches, the buying and selling of personal

1

We are grateful to one of our anonymous reviewers for raising several of the definitional points in this
section.
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data online, and the use of unsuspecting people’s computers for
spamming/phishing/illegal hosting (see Cheney, 2003, 2005; Anderson et al., 2012 for
the discussion of definitions and types of online property offenses). Two aspects of this
definition are worth highlighting: that OPC is perpetrated online, and that it involves the
theft of property. We discuss the importance of these distinctions below.
Defining a crime as ‘perpetrated online’ is not a simple matter. Some types of
OPC have a significant offline component. For example, identity theft and credit card
fraud can and often do result from “dumpster diving”, theft from mailboxes, or stealing
relatives’ personal information through paper documents (Allison et al., 2005; Elbirt,
2005; White and Fisher, 2008; Copes and Vieraitis, 2009; Morris, 2010). When
fraudulent transactions are reported, it is often impossible to infer exactly how the
information was obtained, or even how it was exploited. Accordingly, in our review of
the data that follows, we are at pains to distinguish between sources which focus
exclusively on crime perpetrated online, as our definition requires, and those which
aggregate data on an overlapping, but distinct, quantity of criminal activity.
Establishing that property was taken in a perpetration of an online crime is also
complex. If the ‘property’ at issue is a person’s identity, a problem is created because
some victims of online identity theft never become aware that their details have been
stolen, and indeed do not lose their identity so much as ‘share’ it with the criminal.
Others may have their details exploited to obtain products or services but will suffer no
direct loss themselves – arguably a crime more similar to defamation than ‘theft’, at least
as far as the original owner of the data is concerned. Equally, online property crime may
result in no direct profit to the criminal in cases where, rather than seeking financial
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payouts, the criminal steals intellectual property which may then be exploited in other
ways. Accordingly, as we review the data that follows, we consider the types of property
at issue and problems related to the quantification of property lost.
Additionally, other factors may bias or inhibit full documentation of OPC.
Insurance company requirements that victims report losses to the police may bias data in
favor of higher value losses, while the active encouragement to report fraud offered by
websites such as eBay may have other skewing effects (see House of Lords Science and
Technology Committee, 2007, p.110). Equally, changing technology itself may influence
target selection by criminals. As Biderman and Reiss noted in 1967, crime data produced
by organizations responsible for policing or adjudication “are not some objectively
observable universe of ‘criminal acts’, but rather those events defined, captured, and
processed as such by some institutional mechanism” (p. 1). Accordingly, we sought to
remain continually vigilant of what is referred to elsewhere as the ‘dark figure’ problem –
that is, factors that cause reported statistics to diverge from (and generally
underrepresent) the true nature and extent of crime.
Notwithstanding these significant challenges, there is a pressing need to count
online property crime for two reasons. First, it is likely that it is increasing. Internet
usage has increased dramatically in the United States in recent decades, such that in
September of 2012, 81% of American adults and 95% of teens accessed the internet (Pew
Research Center, 2013). This change can be reasonably compared to other expansions of
human activity through time and space. Melbin (1978) showed how the expansion of
human activities past dusk, facilitated by the introduction of electric lighting into newly
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settled territories in the West, had an impact on crime. Every time human activity crosses
new ‘frontiers’, crime seems to follow.
Second, the potential harm from OPC is unknown. In the case of property crime,
‘harmfulness’ is almost always quantified in terms of the financial losses accrued by the
victim (Davies, 2012). Data on losses from property crime are, in fact, regularly
published by the FBI, though no facility is provided to allow a breakdown of online vs.
offline crimes which, alongside other concerns about the representativeness of the FBI’s
data, makes it impossible to check how much harm OPC is causing or to relate it to more
familiar measures such as the financial harm caused by other thefts. Accordingly,
rendering a reasonably satisfactory picture of the quantity of financial losses that accrue
from OPC is critical to our ability to track its seriousness as a social problem.
Detecting the ‘true’ extent of OPC poses questions that are not only conceptual,
therefore, but also methodologically technical. In what follows, we consider specifically
the limitations of official statistics, victimization surveys and other approaches to data
collection when applied to the problem of counting OPC in order to make the case that
greater attention should be devoted to assessing the harmfulness and prevalence of OPC
in the United States.

THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM: HOW PREVALENT IS OPC?
At the same time as traditional property crime has fallen nationally, the online
market for personal and financial data has formed (see Holt and Lampke, 2010 for an
empirical study of such online marketplaces). After 2004, according to Moore and his
colleagues (2009), identity theft and credit card fraud became increasingly organized and
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elaborate, evolving from a problem of ‘insiders’ with access to sensitive information
(such as store attendants) to one with a novel division of labor. Phishermen (and
sometimes spammers) would send out emails and viruses to attract naïve customers to
fake bank web sites requesting a person to enter their bank account number and password
for ‘confirmation’ or to avoid ‘suspension of the account’. Botnet herders would
manipulate infected computers to gather keystroke information and to direct these
computers – unbeknownst to their owners – to execute specific programs, host fake web
sites and online pharmacies, and send out spam emails. Brokers and cashiers would buy
bank account information in bulk and would in turn hire unsuspecting money mules
(through job advertisements for positions of ‘transaction processor’ or ‘account
executive’) to accept money transfers from these stolen bank accounts into their own
accounts, keep a commission, and then irretrievably transfer the rest of the money
through Western Union (or other untraceable means) to the cashiers (Moore, Clayton,
and Anderson, 2009). In 2011, Symantec reported the price for 10,000 bots (infected
computers acting as ‘robots’ on commands) was around $15, while stolen credit card
numbers could fetch between $0.07 and $100 each (Symantec, 2011, p. 6).
When it comes to understanding the scope and incidence of conventional, nononline crime types, criminal justice researchers and professionals have several options.
Traditional ways of measuring crime include official statistics from the FBI’s Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR), victimization survey data (from both individuals and businesses
affected), and self-reported crime and delinquency from various sources (though there is
no uniform nationally representative survey of self-reported crime involvement with large
samples of adults – see Addington, 2010, for an overview.) Of the three main sources of
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crime measurement, official statistics and victimization data are, at least in theory, most
relevant for providing information about the extent of OPC. Additionally, these are the
only sources of data that presently have the potential to derive national estimates of the
scope of the problem in the United States.
The differences between measures of crime reported to (and by) the police
reproduced in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program and measures of
victimization gleaned from NCVS have been analyzed and dissected extensively
(Biderman and Lynch, 1991; Loftin and McDowall, 2010; Lynch and Addington, 2007;
Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips, 2002; Savitz, 1978; Skogan, 1977, 1984; Xie et al., 2006;
Zawitz et al., 2003). This literature has two lessons with particular relevance for
interpreting data in relation to OPC. First, existing research shows consistently that a
much smaller proportion of victims of property crime report their victimization compared
to victims of violent crime. Second, the most prominent reasons that victims of property
crime do not report their victimization are threefold: the crime or its resultant losses are
minor enough that they are not worth the time and effort of reporting, the property was
recovered, or victims do not believe police could help recover the property (Skogan,
1984; Harlow, 1985; Hart & Rennison, 2003). Accordingly, when assessing the validity
of data on the prevalence of OPC nationally, existing research suggests strongly that the
extent of the problem will be underestimated in official statistics (White & Fisher, 2008),
and that there will be an overrepresentation of high-loss crimes2.

2

There is also a possibility that the need to create a record of a crime for insurance purposes will play an
important role in biasing the types of crimes reported, though we note there is only limited evidence for the
importance of insurance as an incentive to report crimes in other areas (Skogan, 1984; Harlow, 1985; Hart
& Rennison, 2003).
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According to the broad consensus among criminology researchers, backed up by
the UCR reports, property crime has been declining since the early 1990s in the United
States (Blumstein and Wallman, 2005; Levitt, 2004; Mishra and Lalumière, 2009;
Zimring, 2006) as well as internationally (Mishra and Lalumière, 2009; Tseloni et al.,
2010). Of course, OPC does not appear as a specific category in the Uniform Crime
Report estimates compiled by the FBI, upon which so much research and speculation
regarding crime trends are based (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013). Rather
the observation of this decline in property crime is based on counts of burglary, larcenytheft, motor vehicle theft, and (to a limited extent) arson.
Several explanations have been offered to account for the overall crime decline.
Levitt (2004) summarized the most commonly cited hypotheses for the fall in crime rates:
increased imprisonment; the aging of the population (i.e., the drop in the proportion of
high-risk youth); improved economic conditions; innovative police strategies (e.g., ‘hot
spots’ and ‘community policing’); changes in gun control laws; increased use of the death
penalty; increased numbers of police officers; the legalization of abortion and attendant
reduced number of unwanted, at-risk children; and the decline in crack-cocaine
consumption. Levitt’s list is not exhaustive; others have suggested that growths in
immigration may account for a reduction in crime (Wadsworth, 2010), particularly
violent offending, or that changes in “youth culture,” observed by qualitative researchers
in inner-city neighborhoods, may also explain the crime drop (Curtis, 1998). While a few
of these explanations find more empirical support than others, in reality the crime decline
debate remains largely unresolved and the trends are “murkier” than much of the existing
literature suggests (Baumer and Wolff, 2014).

9	
  

Data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) tend to confirm the
downward trend as well: in the United States, “[p]roperty victimization [in 2010] fell to
the lowest levels since 1993” (Truman, 2011, p. 7). Questions about the experience of
identity theft, defined as an unauthorized use of an account, an unauthorized attempt to
create a new account, or another fraudulent use of personal information, were only added
to the National Crime Victimization Survey in 2004, however, and thus trend data only
exist for the period after the most dramatic crime decline had happened (Baum, 2006;
Harrell & Langton, 2013). According to the NCVS estimates, the number of households
affected by identity theft has risen from 3.1% in 2004 to 7% in 2010, while the number of
individuals affected rose from 5% of the population in 2008 to 7% in 2012 (See Table 1;
Baum, 2004; Langton, 2011; Langton & Planty, 2010; Harrell & Langton, 2013). At the
same time, Piquero and her colleagues concluded that the “number of households being
victimized annually rang[es] between 5% and 25%” (Piquero, Cohen, and Piquero, 2011,
p. 437). These figures do contain some indication that identity theft rates are rising (see
Table 1). Regrettably, however, neither source collected information regarding the mode
of perpetration of the crimes in question.3
The other nationally representative data source on identity theft, credit card fraud,
and other forms of online fraud victimization is a longitudinal survey launched in 2003–
2004 by Javelin Strategy & Research, a private company (see Javelin, 2009). The sample
is a nationally representative rotating sample of about 5,000 U.S. adults, and the survey is
3

It is important to underscore a critical difference in the ways the prevalence of online property crime is
measured in available sources. Whereas the NCVS measures the ‘number of victimizations’ per 100
individuals aged 12+, the data do not account for whether the same or different individuals were
victimized. As a result, the numbers do not actually tell us what percentage of individuals are affected by
online property crime, but only the rate at which victimization incidents occurred. The best estimates for
the rates at which people are actually affected by online property crime suggest it affects between 4.4% and
6.0% of the adult population annually (Javelin Strategy & Research, 2012), or between 5.5% and 7.3% of
households nationally, according to NCVS data (Langton, 2011).
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conducted annually. Reports detailing the results of the survey have been issued every
year since 2005 (see Table 1).
[Table 1 about here]
Javelin sought to break down its 2008 data on identity theft by method of perpetration, an
effort which was hampered by the fact that 65% of victims in that year did not know how
their information had been obtained (Javelin, 2009). Only 4% of victims knew they had
lost their data online, while a further 4% believed it had been lost through a data breach.
Meanwhile, fully 15% believed their identities had been compromised after their wallet
was stolen. Javelin’s conclusion, that most identity theft occurs offline, was in line with
other research, but suffers from the flaw that victims of OPC are far less likely to know or
understand how their information was compromised than are victims who are aware they
lost their wallets.
Fewer than 20% of the identity theft victims sampled by NCVS reported their
victimization to law enforcement agencies (Langton and Planty, 2010).4 A similar
estimate of reporting rates is derived by Copes and his colleagues (2010) from the second
wave of a nationally representative National Public Survey on White Collar Crime
conducted by the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) in 2005. That survey
found that 19.6% of identity theft and credit card fraud victims in their sample reported
their victimization to a crime control agency (Copes et al., 2010, p. 1048). Results from
the third wave of that survey, conducted in 2010, suggested 26% of victims of identity

4

Interestingly, the U.S. Department of Justice has a section on their web site titled “What Should I Do If
I've Become a Victim of Identity Theft?” It advises victims to report their victimization to the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and several other organizations (for example, Internal Revenue Service, Social
Security Administration, and credit reporting companies) but reporting to the police is not included in that
list. (http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/websites/idtheft.html, accessed 8/14/14).
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theft or credit card fraud reported their victimization (Huff, Desilets, and Kane, 2010, p.
16).
[Table 2 about here]
Table 2 summarizes the estimates of reporting to police derived from NCVS and
the NW3C survey and compares them to the reporting of traditional property crime to
police (based on NCVS data). Identity theft victimization is reported to police at a
significantly lower rate – around 20% – compared to the proportion of people who report
their victimizations from traditional property crime to police – about 40%, according to
NCVS data (Truman, 2011). Moreover, one important consideration makes this
difference in reporting a conservative estimate: neither NCVS nor the NW3C survey
separate identity theft that is perpetrated online from that which results from “dumpster
diving” or stealing mail from mailboxes. The real gap in reporting between OPC and
traditional property crime may be even wider.
Data from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), supplied by victimized
consumers on a voluntary basis, help to add further insights when juxtaposed with those
from NCVS (U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2004, 2008, 2012). According to the FTC
data, the percentage of people victimized by identity theft or fraud who notified police
varied between 35% and 49% for the years 2001–2008. An actual police report was filed
in between 27% and 40% of cases depending on the year (see Table 2). However, the
FTC data, besides having the same problem of non-separation of online crimes, also have
another serious flaw: they clearly cannot be considered representative of all victims of
fraud and identity theft, but rather represent (at best) only those individuals reaching out
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to the data collection agency.5 The most that can be said for these data, therefore, is that
among those who take the step of voluntarily reporting their victimization to the FTC,
reporting to the police also appears more common.
Victims of internet-based crimes also have a separate venue for reporting: the
Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) where complaints can be filed online and annual
reports are produced summarizing the information received from the reporting victims
(see the latest report in Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2013). These data seem to be
useful for detecting certain fraud patterns and new fraud scenarios, which is helpful for
law enforcement in connecting cases. IC3 data are also helpful in issuing warnings to
consumers about the emerging threats and online frauds. At the same time, these data are
much less useful in piecing together a comprehensive picture of online crime since the
questions about the generalizability arise with IC3 data just as much, if not more, than
with the FTC data. For example, plenty of complaints filed through IC3 are related to
online auctions, which may be a result of eBay’s encouragement of its consumers to
report to IC3 (see House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2007, p.110).
In sum, the picture from available data sources suggests that OPC affects a
sizeable and growing proportion of households annually in comparison to traditional
property crime, but that reporting rates to police are relatively low. Moreover, OPC
levels and trends are not counted at all in the FBI’s UCR metric, which is most
commonly used to assess crime levels and trends in the United States. Rather, the only

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5

In addition, over the years of data collection, fewer and fewer consumers answer the question about
reporting their victimization to police (less than half of people reporting their victimizations to FTC
provided an answer about reporting it to police in 2009, 2010, and 2011), thus further undermining the
generalizability of FTC data.
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available sources for national estimates of the prevalence of the problem are victimization
surveys. Next, we assess the level of damage that OPC precipitates on its victims.

THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM: HOW MUCH DOES OPC COST?
Estimates of financial losses from online theft and fraud are compiled by Javelin
Strategy & Research (2011), using a methodology closest to the one employed in
calculating losses from traditional crime by the FBI in their annual Crime in the United
States reports (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013). The results paint a picture
that clearly shows losses from online crime far surpass those from traditional crime (see
Table 3) and that the proportion of people or households financially affected by OPC is
substantial.
[Table 3 about here]
By asking respondents to identify the date of their discovery of the loss and the
‘approximate total dollar value of what the person obtained while misusing information’,
Javelin computes a moving three-year average of monetary losses (except for years 2008
and 2009, where only a standard one-year estimate was available at the time of report
publication). As can be seen from Table 3, the total losses vary within the range of $45
billion to $60 billion yearly during the period of 2003–2009. Table 3 also includes direct
personal financial losses from identity theft, estimated using NCVS: these ranged from
$14.4 billion to $16.5 billion annually over the same period of time. UCR estimates of
monetary losses reported from the traditional property crimes such as burglary,
larceny/theft, and motor vehicle theft, by comparison, range between $15.2 billion and
$17.6 billion.
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Three important considerations should be kept in mind when comparing these
three sources of data on financial losses from property crime. First, the estimates from
Javelin Strategy & Research include the losses borne out by the industry (banking
institutions and merchants), whereas data from NCVS only include financial losses borne
out by the private individuals. The lack of awareness among victims may mean the actual
value of financial losses is higher, though difficult to estimate.6 According to the
estimates by Gordon and his colleagues (2007), individuals constitute only approximately
34% of the victims of identity theft, with financial industry organizations constituting
over 37% of the victims, and retail businesses representing 20% (Gordon et al., 2007, p.
3). Thus, individual victimizations only represent the tip of the iceberg in terms of
financial losses. Different methodologies of calculating losses and different definitions of
online crime (identity theft, credit/debit card fraud, etc.) lead to different estimates of per
person and overall losses. Moreover, surveys of individuals can bias estimates of losses
upwards if the percentage of population affected is small and may not be represented
well, even in fairly large samples (see Florêncio and Herley, 2013, for an excellent
discussion of this issue). Taking these considerations into account, even if upwardly
biased, the survey estimates could result in a figure that is a closer reflection of real
losses to the industry.
Second, the UCR estimates include financial losses from property crime against
both individuals and organizations but only from the crimes that were reported to the
police. Even though only less than half of all property crime is reported to the police
6

As an example, based on a series of studies commissioned by Symantec and conducted by the Ponemon
Institute (2012) where large U.S. companies (over 2000 employees per company) were surveyed, the
average financial loss from data breach incidents per year per company is estimated to be $8.9 million.
However, this estimate cannot be easily translated into a national total because of the method by which the
sample was drawn.
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(according to NCVS estimates), the figures for financial losses cannot be assumed to be
representative of losses for all such crimes because one of the main reasons some
property crimes are not reported to law enforcement is the insignificance of losses (as
described above, in the section on prevalence of OPC). However, to adjust for this
possibility, a crude estimate is offered in Table 3 as a proxy – the doubling of the
officially reported losses. Even adopting this liberal approach, which likely overstates the
true amount of total losses from traditional property crime adjusting for non-reporting,
the resulting estimates are still much lower than the estimated direct losses caused by
identity theft (see Table 3).
To summarize, the financial losses attributable to identity theft appear far in
excess of the damage inflicted by traditional property crime, though there is no clear
indication of the role of online perpetration in these data, or of whether levels of online
perpetration are rising or falling in recent years. Nevertheless, we believe the data
reviewed above do constitute a prima facie case that OPC rates and losses may be
comparable to, or even greater than, those from traditional property crime in recent years.

PUZZLE FOR THE NEW AGE: HOW SHOULD WE COUNT ONLINE PROPERTY
CRIME?
The UCR was designed to count the kinds of direct contact predatory crimes
typical of the 1940’s and 1950’s, where victims and offenders came together in time and
space. Today, victims and offenders can meet in cyberspace and the authorities that may
be able to do something about it are often private corporations rather than police, who
have traditionally generated crime statistics. The possibility arises that the crime drop is a
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consequence, in part, of an incremental shift of criminal behavior out from under police
surveillance or auspices, and into the online realm. Present data render this proposition
untestable, but of critical importance to researchers.
Given the substantial number of people affected and the huge amounts of
financial losses caused, as well as the organized nature of crime markets for online theft,
the U.S. criminal justice system needs a better way to incorporate information about OPC
into its statistics on trends and patterns of crime. It’s dangerous for researchers to come
up with explanations for the crime drop by building theories based on assumptions about
the nature of crime that are increasingly outdated, because the trends in criminality may
be incorrectly described. The implication is a profound one: widespread criminological
concern about the ‘crime drop’ may be based on misconceptions about the extent or even
the existence of that drop itself. Next, we contemplate the challenges that will beset any
attempt to incorporate online property crime into generalized crime measures.
Most attempts to count crime involve making the critical decision to count either
incidents of offending or victimization, and OPC is no exception.
[Table 4 about here]
One successful security breach of a network may only be a single offense, but its
effects on victims may be widespread if millions of data records containing personal
information are accessed by the hackers. Such a crime may expose millions of people to
becoming potential victims of identity theft or account fraud (see Table 4 for the
incidents with the largest volumes of financial/personal information exposed). Yet each
data breach incident of this kind may be perpetrated by just a few offenders, or only one
offender may be involved at the initial stage. Thus, depending on what one counts, the
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numbers of offenses may differ from the number of offenders or victims by orders of
magnitude.
Among traditional types of crime, very few are characterized by such a massive
asymmetry between the numbers of offenders and victims. A rare exception to this rule
is Bernie Madoff’s ‘Ponzi scheme’, which is an unusual example of a traditional property
crime of fraud. In that extraordinary case, thousands of individuals, plus thousands of
organizations, can be counted among the victims while there are only a handful of
offenders. It seems that separate (and often very disparate) counts need to be compiled
for victims, offenders, incidents, and financial losses, each of which might be considered
a valid measure in the context of an attempt to measure the extent of crime and the harm
it causes. Below, we will consider each of these categories and describe possible
solutions for counting.
Data on OPC offenders are, if anything, likely to be the hardest to calculate. The
time and space constraints (Cohen and Felson, 1979) that govern most of the traditional
crime are substantially relaxed for OPC. Offenders may, and often do, reside in other
countries halfway across the globe, whereas victims may be U.S. residents and
businesses. Such crimes are particularly hard to solve, making data collection on
offenders very complex. While certain offenders may be caught and portrayed in media,
the profile of such individuals is likely to be highly unrepresentative of offenders
generally. In short, data on offending itself is likely to be very hard to come by, and may
transgress certain assumptions that underlie the attempt to produce a ‘national’ estimate
of OPC prevalence.
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The counting of victims also poses conceptual challenges. According to Newman
(2003), “over 90% of people report their lost or stolen card to the card issuer within one
day” (p. 8). In such cases, if a person suffered no financial losses because the credit card
company reversed any unauthorized charges, can the credit card holder be considered –
and counted as – a victim of OPC? Does it depend on whether the person was even aware
of the unauthorized charges? What if s/he was made aware of the situation only after the
credit card company resolved the issue? The parallel with traditional types of crimes
would be an ‘attempted’ crime. Should we then consider the individuals exposed to OPC
but bearing no financial damage as ‘potential victims’ or ‘victims of attempted crime’
and only count the credit card company as an actual victim? Additionally, how is one to
classify the victim whose financial information is stolen but never exploited, for whatever
reason? Measures of victimization are particularly ineffective around incidents such as
those where the putative ‘victim’ either suffers no harm at all, or is unaware of what has
happened. These are the questions that need to be resolved for the purpose of developing
a system of consistent OPC data.
An additional challenge results from the fact that businesses affected by OPC may
be unwilling to come forward with information, in the effort to preserve their reputation
and their customers’ trust:
Banks and creditors typically do not notify the police about identity thefts, and
police do not contact banks and creditors—and even if police did contact banks and
creditors, there are no established procedures for the transfer of relevant
information. […] In fact, there are indications that the private sector would rather
keep this type of identity theft private, electing to address the control of the problem
on its own. Many credit card companies and financial institutions view identity theft
through a cost-benefit analysis, and the costs of implementing anti-identity theft
measures exceed their benefits.
(White and Fisher, 2008, p. 10)
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Other researchers also confirm the desire to conceal commercial victimization
through data breaches (Clarke and Newman, 2002; Smith, 1999; Taylor, 2002), and add
that managers may doubt the ability of police to deal with the crime, which would require
technologically advanced knowledge or equipment.
As a partial remedy for this problem, data breach laws requiring businesses to
report any substantial security breaches have been passed in almost all U.S. states in the
last 10 years, starting with California that passed the first law of this kind in 2002. As of
April 2014, 47 states – with the exception of Alabama, New Mexico, and South Dakota –
had enacted security breach laws (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2014). As a
result, the reporting of security breaches has improved (for more on the effectiveness of
data breach laws, see Romanosky et al., 2011).
There is also a centralized database provided by a non-profit organization relying
on volunteers that accumulates information on security breaches and on the number of
personal and financial records exposed to online theft – DataLossDB.org project (Open
Security Foundation, n.d.). Figure 1 plots the DataLossDB records of reported data
breach incidents on a timeline: monthly number of incidents from 2005 to mid-2014
(latest available when the article went to press), regardless of the number of records
stolen or exposed in each incident. In the period between 2009 and 2013, the increase
looks exponential. Symantec (2012) estimates that in 2011, on average, 1.1 million
identities got exposed per breach incident (p. 9), compared to 260,000 in 2010
(Symantec, 2011, p. 6).
[Figure 1 about here]
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Finally, when it comes to counting losses from OPC, the problem is similar to that
of arson: sometimes, arson results in very little damage (if fire does not spread or is put
out quickly) and sometimes damages run into millions of dollars. Often, external factors
which have nothing to do with the offenders or their intent determine the amount of
losses. To resolve (or rather avoid) this problem, UCR data on property crime exclude
arson all together from loss calculations. For OPC, the amount of actual losses can be
calculated only if a mechanism is developed to gather information from both individuals
and organizations. However, a mandatory reporting system for financial losses is very
unlikely to be implemented unless the government provides a financial incentive to
disclose this information (for example, in the form of tax breaks or loss write-offs tied to
the requirement of mandatory disclosure). Another possible solution to this problem can
come in the form of mandatory insurance against online fraud that would be required of
any businesses with substantial online presence or possibility of exposing customer data
through online security breaches. A certain level of online security would be required to
purchase the insurance (with discounts for a higher level of security) and the reporting of
security breaches (to the insurer or to special investigative divisions) would be a
mandatory requirement for collecting on the insurance. This method might ensure high
rates of reporting – similarly to what we see with motor vehicle theft (according to the
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (2013), the theft of motor vehicles is one of the
most consistently highly reported property crimes).
Otherwise, the only viable option of gathering data on organizations’ financial
losses from OPC is the one that has been implemented by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
(BJS) in collaboration with the RAND Corporation in the National Computer Security
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Survey (NCSS) (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006). The survey has been devised to
collect information from business organizations about their cybercrime victimization
experiences. Despite the strong sampling procedure that was intended to produce solid
national estimates (a stratified, random sample of nearly 36,000 businesses was selected),
the response rate to this survey was only about 23%. Such a low response rate calls into
question the generalizability of any estimates obtained from the survey, especially since it
is not clear whether the businesses that responded were more or less or equally likely to
be victimized compared to the businesses that gave no response to the survey.
It is also important to make a distinction between two types of cybercrime against
organizations: 1) malicious attacks that are most similar to vandalism – computer viruses,
denial of service, and other attacks designed to bring damage to the systems without the
intent to profit financially from such damage, and 2) cybercrime that is perpetrated with
the explicit intent to profit (designated as cyber theft in the BJS report (Rantala, 2008)).
These two types of OPC (cyber-vandalism and cyber-theft) may have very different
origins and types of perpetrators but both cause substantial financial losses to the
organizations targeted.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE COUNTER-TRENDS AND INVISIBLE LINKS
While data and research in the area are incipient, the analysis above suggests there
is ample reason to devote greater attention to counting OPC in order to assess whether the
explosion in online property crime in the United States is so great as to reverse the
commonly observed ‘crime drop’ since the mid-1990s. The data presented here suggest
that the rate at which United States residents are now affected by OPC actually outstrips
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that of traditional property crime, which continues to fall. Moreover, the amount of
financial harm they suffer is far greater in dollar amounts than that inflicted by traditional
property crime. Existing data allow us to suggest the possibility that this ‘wave’ in crime
may override any benefits Americans have enjoyed as a result of the steady drop in
traditional forms of property crime recorded in the UCR.
The counting of OPC remains a complex enterprise, however, and is bedeviled by
the one question that has confronted criminologists when it comes to counting crime
throughout history, namely: what is the unit to be counted? Conceptually, OPC may
present many fascinating issues, but for counting purposes there is really only one
problem – how is one crime distinguished from another? In this regard, counting OPC,
whether by offenses, offenders or victims, really requires criminologists to ask the same
questions. Criminologists have traditionally counted discrete acts as separate ‘crimes,’
but have consistently wrestled with the conundrum of how to count criminality which is,
in effect, spread out over several acts such as spree or serial/repeat offenses. Of course,
the effect of a decision to count a series of offenses as ‘one’ offense has a radical effect
on crime counts. OPC is no different in this regard, though the ability to collect millions
of records in a single data breach raise the possibility that the measurement implications
are much more dramatic. With offenders operating computer systems that seek
continually to hack and subsequently to exploit personal data, it is hard to say when one
offense ends and another begins. Stealing credit cards may be one criminal act, but in
using them one may commit many more.
When it comes to counting ‘the victim’ and, relatedly, ‘the victimization’, the
same problem occurs. Clearly, victims are a diverse group and victimizations vary in
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their financial impact, but for counting purposes the real challenge is saying where one
victim, and one victimization, begins and ends. Recall that in the case of arson, the FBI
has given up on calculating losses because it seems unreasonable to attribute the losses
from a fire that burns out of control to a single offense. But there is no really logical
basis for this decision, except to say that calculating losses in this way would produce
wildly disparate estimates of losses occasioned by arson that might in some way distort
the appearance of how serious the problem really is. In the same way, OPC victims may
experience losses from their experiences that go far beyond the financial. They may
suffer personal inconvenience as they try to piece their lives back together, or other
collateral financial consequences as credit ratings drop or checks bounce. Arguably one
can go much further than this: victims might suffer psychological problems, as may the
people around them who experience the trauma vicariously. Even readers of this article
may be victims should they experience some increment of anxiety in contemplating the
extent of OPC. For counting purposes, then, where does one stop? If one is to count the
number of victims or characterize the extent of victimization, one has to draw some
limits, even in the knowledge that such limits are necessarily arbitrary.
Finding a way to compute OPC rates of either prevalence or harm in a way that
permits them to be ‘compared’ or ‘collated’ in some way to figures related to traditional
property crime may one day be possible, therefore, but only after a series of decisions has
been made on how to define the units of count in ways that are broadly acceptable to the
criminological community. The sense in which these figures can indeed be ‘collated’
meaningfully with existing measures such as the UCR ‘index crime’ rate, however, will
depend heavily not only upon the compatibility of the counting rules with those
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employed for traditional crime (about which there will no doubt be considerable debate)
but also whether criminologists themselves can be convinced that such a collation is wise.

Stepping back from the conceptual issues that this question elicits, however, one can at
least return to the preliminary assertion that underlies this paper: namely that increases in
OPC may not only be large enough to merit policy attention but also that they may exist
in contrasting relation to trends in traditional property crime. As artefactual as such a
relationship may be and as tentative as the suggestion must be, given the state of existing
data, one urgent question may be to examine the data further for any such relationship
and the mechanisms that might underlie it. Obviously, there are many possible causal
relationships between OPC and traditional property crime, including some compatible
with the suggestion that their countervailing trends are evidence of some interaction. We
can speculate that engrossment in online media may cause criminals to change their
methods strategically. Simultaneously, fewer real-world interactions may occur,
reducing opportunities for traditional property crime to occur. The theoretical
implications of such relationships for our understanding of the crime drop itself may be
multi-faceted and certainly warrant further exploration. For example, some direct-contact
predatory crimes may turn violent precisely because of the proximity of the offender and
victim in time and space. This is not so true for cyber predatory crimes since the two
never meet in person. So, one indirect consequence of property crimes occurring online
could be a drop in the violent crime rate. Of course, some violent crimes may occur
online as would be the case with cyber bullying and sexual predators of minors. But they
may also escape the notice of the police. Alternatively, time spent online by most youth
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of the peak crime-prone age is seen by some researchers as a self-incapacitation
mechanism, leading to the decrease in traditional crimes (Ward, 2011).
In short, available data raise the possibility OPC is a growing problem and that,
whether incorporated into index crime measures or not, criminologists would be wise to
be circumspect before declaring that crime has dropped as radically as traditional
measures appear to reflect. The scope for new measurement techniques to capture OPC
is clearly wide, as work in the area has barely begun and definitional questions remain
pressing. Most importantly, however, the theoretical implications of incorporating an
understanding of OPC into observations of crime trends generally are that criminologists
must revisit the fundamental assumptions that have underpinned approaches to measuring
crime that stretch back for the entire history of the discipline.
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Table 1. National Estimates of Incidence/Prevalence of Identity Theft and Traditional
Property Crime
Javelin, identity
theft/fraud
victimizations

UCR, all
property crime
reported to
police

NCVS, identity
theft
victimizations

NCVS, property
crime
victimizations
rate per 100
population aged
12+
16.3
16.1
15.4
16.1**
14.7
13.5
12.7
12.0

% adults
rate per 100
% households
affected
population
affected
Year
2003
4.7
3.6
2004
4.3
3.5
3.1
2005
4.0
3.4
5.5
2006
3.7
3.3
2007
3.6
3.3
6.6
2008
4.3
3.2
5.0*
2009
4.8
3.0
7.3
2010
3.5
2.9
7.0
_____________________
* refers to individuals, not households (a different method was employed)
** data for 2006 NCVS were gathered using a different methodology and should be
interpreted as a part of the series with caution

Sources of data: Javelin Strategy & Research; Uniform Crime Reports (Crime in the
United States); National Crime Victimization Survey
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Table 2. Percent of Victims Who Notified Police or Contacted Law Enforcement to
Report Victimization

FTC (identity theft)

NCVS
(property
crime)

NCVS
(identity
theft)

NW3C
survey
(identity
theft and
credit card
fraud)
reported to a
crime control
agency
20%
26%
-

report
contacted
notified
taken by
reported to
law
police
police
police
enforcement
2001
49%
40%
37%
2002
45%
36%
40%
2003
40%
31%
38%
2004
39%
30%
39%
2005
40%
30%
40%
2006
38%
30%
38%
2007
35%
27%
37%
17%
2008
36%
28%
40%
2009
(73%)
(62%)
39%
2010
(72%)
(62%)
39%
2011
(70%)
(57%)
37%
_____________________
Note: Data in parentheses should be interpreted with caution since they are based on the
information gathered from less than half of the ID theft victims who contacted the FTC
directly (the rest of the victims did not provide information about law enforcement
contact). For example, 81% of victims provided this information in 2008 but only 42% of
victims did so in 2009 and subsequent years.
Sources of data: FTC (2004, 2008, 2012); NCVS (2001–2011); Copes et al. (2010); Huff
et al. (2010).
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Table 3. National Estimates of Monetary Losses from Online and Traditional Property
Crime
Javelin,
identity
theft/fraud
victimizations

UCR, all property
crime reported to
police

NCVS,
identity theft
victimizations

NCVS,
property
crime
victimizations

monetary monetary
loss, in
loss
monetary loss, monetary loss,
in billion $
billion $
doubled* in billion $
$17.0
$34.0
$14.4
$16.1
$32.2
$14.7
$16.5
$33.0
$10.4
$15.6
$17.6
$35.2
$16.5***
$17.6
$35.2
$14.5
$16.1
$17.2
$34.4
$16.6**
$16.2
$15.2
$30.4
$13.3
-

monetary loss,
Year in billion $
2003
$58
2004
$60
2005
$57
2006
$50
2007
$45
2008
$48
2009
$54
____________________
* to adjust for non-reporting using a conservative approach
** direct losses only
*** data for 2006 NCVS were gathered using a different methodology, should be
interpreted as a part of the series with caution

Sources of data: Javelin Strategy & Research; Uniform Crime Reports (Crime in the
United States); National Crime Victimization Survey
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Table 4. Twelve Largest Domestic Incidents of Security Breaches Officially Reported in
the U.S. in 2005–2014, Resulting in Losses of Customers’ Personal and Financial Data
Number of
records
exposed

152,000,000

145,000,000

Type of information
stolen
Customers’ names and
IDs, encrypted credit
card numbers and
passwords
Customers’ names,
email addresses,
personal addresses and
phone numbers, DOB

Method
of data
security
breach

Date

Hack

2013-10-03

Hack

2014-05-21

Organization

Adobe Systems, Inc.

eBay Inc.
Heartland Payment
Systems, Tower Federal
Credit Union, Beverly
National Bank
Target Brands, Inc.,
Fazio Mechanical
Services, Inc.

130,000,000

Credit card numbers

Hack

2009-01-20

110,000,000

Customers’ names,
addresses, phone
numbers, and credit
card info

Hack

2013-12-18

94,000,000

Credit card numbers

Hack

2007-01-17

TJX Companies Inc.

77,000,000

Personal info, possibly
credit card info

Hack

2011-04-26

Sony Corporation

40,000,000

Credit card numbers

Hack

2005-06-19

CardSystems, Visa,
MasterCard, American
Express

Account info, personal
2011-11-10
info, encrypted credit
Hack
card numbers
Account info (user
32,000,000
Hack
2009-12-14
names and passwords)
Personal info (name,
Stolen
26,500,000
2006-05-22
SSN, DOB) of U.S.
computer
military veterans
Personal info, bank
24,600,000
Hack
2011-05-02
account info, credit card
numbers
Personal info, account
24,000,000
Hack
2012-01-15
info
________________
Source of data: Open Security Foundation (www.DataLossDB.org)
35,000,000

Steam (Valve, Inc.)
RockYou Inc.
U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs
Sony Online
Entertainment, Sony
Corporation
Zappos
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